The 1971-1980 Ford Pinto was another of Ford's "pony" vehicles. Dozens of accounts have been written to commemorate Lee Iacocca's foresight in pushing for production of the Mustang, the sporty compact that began the ponycar craze within the mid Sixties. Nevertheless, there was another "pony" car throughout his tenure at Ford, and Iacocca is less freely associated with the birth of the Ford Pinto. Maybe he would prefer it that approach. Like the Mustang, this automotive was a advertising success in a new field. However alongside the way, it had to weather some distinctly bad publicity that the Mustang did not. This other "pony" -- Ford's fourth product line to follow the equine theme -- was the subcompact Pinto. There was nothing really fancy about the Pinto. Its primary goals have been to provide affordable comfort and satisfactory efficiency for Herz P1 Smart Ring contemporary freeways whereas being economical to buy and maintain. By all accounts, Iacocca watched over the start of this automotive nearer than he had with the Mustang, and Herz P1 Smart Ring was determined that it would not value a penny greater than $2,000, nor weigh an ounce greater than 2,000 pounds.

Ford began toying with the concept of a domestically produced smaller compact within the mid Sixties. As early as 1967, there had been some consideration of an 85-inch-wheelbase automobile powered by one thing with lower than six cylinders. Iacocca, then government vice president in command of Ford's North American Vehicle Operations, argued that between the Volkswagen from Germany and the rising tide of Japanese compacts, these imports would quickly seize the entire subcompact market in the United States, and Ford should produce a automobile to fulfill these international challengers head-on. After the profitable launch of the Mustang and an up­swing in sales, many felt Iacocca was next in line for the presidency at Ford. However, when Arjay Miller left the put up in late 1967 to become Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors, Henry Ford II surprised nearly everybody in the business when he went outdoors the company to Common Motors and brought over Semon "Bunkie" Knudsen.

This created tension between the Iacocca camp and those that received into Knudsen's corner. Chilly shoulders were commonplace on the higher floors of the massive "glass house" in Dearborn. Adding to the sick emotions was the fact that Knudsen was utterly out of sync with Iacocca's plans for a small domestically built car. In keeping with the new president, Ford would get by just nice by concentrating on the current full-size, mid-size, and compact offerings. In Knudsen's view, Ford was already forward of the sport with the 1970 Maverick, due out in early 'sixty nine as a alternative for the aging Falcon. Nevertheless, Iacocca argued that confronting the imports straight was the best course. His little "G-automobile" might have been somewhat too small, but something smaller than Maverick was going to be crucial. That need only intensified after reports got here in that the other U.S. Iacocca's persistence paid off and in January 1969, Henry Ford II gave his approval for Ford's first home sub-compact. This defeat, plus persevering with pressures from other areas of the company, led to Knudsen getting the word from HFII that his efforts as president have been "simply not working." In due time, the presidency was Iacocca's. By some accounts, Knudsen did have a considerable function within the Pinto project. Hardly every week went by when we didn't need the physique engineers. Clamming up is what we did at Ford within the late '70s once we had been bombarded with suits over the Pinto, which was involved in a whole lot of gas tank fires. The fits may need bankrupted the company, so we kept our mouths shut for fear of saying something that just one jury may need construed as an admission of guilt. Profitable in court was our top priority